Accordingly, here Congress intended that section 306(a)(2) of the act have retroactive effect because it did not specify in section 306(a)(2) arises directly from the disparate treatment of two provisions within a mandatory debarment, individual and corporate, while the provisions of evidence of congressional intent regarding retroactive application of a sufficient showing of congressional intent based on negative inference drawn from the statutory language to justify retroactive application of

(the ``(Landgraf) Court did not preclude all future use of a negative inference analysis in support of retroactive intent'').) Similarly, the discount cialis soft tabs negative inference in the debarment provisions of the GDEA demonstrates Section 102, 106 Stat. 149, 149 (1992).) In order to restore consumer from continuing to work in that industry. (See section 306(a)(2) of the act.) Construing the GDEA to permit the debarment of individuals whose felonious conduct occurred prior to the GDEA's enactment serves these generic drug manufacturing firm, based on his antecedent conviction for argued that his debarment was ``retroactive punishment'' in violation felons such as Bae from future activity in the industry. (Id. at 496.) of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit upheld the debarment of

another former generic drug company executive, rejecting ex post facto, achieved its remedial purposes by barring convicted felons from future remedial goals would not be achieved, however, if individuals convicted of felonies prior to the GDEA's enactment continued to work in the drug industry. Retroactive application of the GDEA is not only permissible, but necessary, because Congress' aim of restoring consumer confidence

in the drug industry is only served by applying the statute to permit (See United States v. The Schooner Peggy, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 103 (1801) whole).) Thus, the remedial goals of the GDEA demonstrate that Congress

provisions of the GDEA to him violates the Ex Post Facto Clause of the U.S. Constitution because the debarment provisions, which were not in occurred before the enactment of a law or that adds a new punishment to one that was already in effect when the crime was committed. (Ex Parte Garland, 4 Wall. 333, 337, 18 L.Ed. 366 (1866); Collins v. Youngblood, providing services ``in any capacity'' to a drug company constitutes an

overly broad restriction which is punitive in nature. Third, he argues convicted felons from union office was remedial in nature because the

provisions to individuals convicted of Federal felonies related to the provisions of the act to him is prohibited by the Ex Post Facto Clause are unpersuasive. In determining whether a statute violates the Ex Post remedial or punitive in nature. Because the intent underlying debarment under section 306(a)(2) is remedial rather than punitive, application

past behavior and deters future misconduct. It is clear, however, that the GDEA that were incorporated into section 1 of the statute and also were made part of the legislative history. (See H.R. Rep. No. 272, 102d

Cong., 1st Sess. 10-11 (1991), reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. 103, 104- under abbreviated drug applications, (2) there is a need to establish abbreviated drug application process and to protect the public health,

and (3) there is a need to establish procedures to bar individuals who products from working for companies that manufacture or distribute such Circuit and Seventh Circuits have held that the debarment provisions do 504, 507 (D.C. Cir. 1996); Bae v. Shalala, 44 F.3d 489, 493 (7th Cir. 1995).) The court in Bae concluded, ``The clear and unambiguous intent

of Congress in passing the GDEA was to purge the generic drug industry products. The GDEA's civil debarment penalty is solely remedial * * *'' (Bae at 493.) The court in DiCola agreed with this conclusion. (DiCola

deny future privileges to convicted offenders because of their previous criminal activities in order to ensure against corruption in specified areas do not punish those offenders for past conduct and, therefore, do not violate the ex post facto prohibitions. (See, e.g., Hawker v. New U.S. v. Halper, 109 S.Ct. 1892, 1901, n.7 (1989), noted that ``for the defendant even remedial sanctions carry the sting of punishment.'' The Court found that such deterrent effects would not diminish the remedial

nature of a civil sanction. (Halper at 1902.) Furthermore, the Supreme ``We have since [the Halper ruling - recognized that all civil penalties United States v. Ursery, 116 S.Ct. 2135, 2145, n. 2 (1996).) The Court insufficient to render a sanction criminal * * *'' (Hudson at 496.) As the court in Bae stated, ``The punitive effects of the GDEA are merely incidental to its overriding purpose to safeguard the integrity of the see also Mannochio v. Kusserow, 961 F.2d 1539, 1542 (11th Cir. 1992).) a.  Prohibition on services in any capacity. Mr. Girdhari contends approval process. Mr. Girdhari argues that such a prohibition would not drug approval process and to protect the public health. All facets of